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TACKLING EMPTY VOTING IN THE EU: THE SHARE-
HOLDERS’ RIGHTS DIRECTIVE AND THE REVISED 
TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE * 
Edita Čulinović-Herc** and Antonija Zubović***
Summary: The rise of the capital market creates new, less noticeable 
forms of holdings of shares. These holdings could be acquired with 
the aim of influencing a company’s decision-making process without 
the intention to hold shares for the long term. One of the forms is new 
vote buying which can appear either as empty voting or as hidden 
ownership. Empty voting refers to voting by a shareholder without the 
corresponding financial interest in the company involved. The reverse 
situation is hidden ownership whereby a party is not the shareholder 
but is entitled to exercise influence and eventually vote as if he/she 
were a shareholder. If a shareholder has an ownership interest in the 
company in which he/she votes, his/her voting would be aligned with 
the interests of the company. If a shareholder votes for a decision con-
trary to the company’s interest, it would affect his/her own economic 
interests because the shares could have been sold even before the 
shareholder’s meeting occurred. 
There are many techniques that lead to empty voting. Those most 
commonly used are: borrowing shares, using equity swaps or buying 
shares on a date close to the record date and then selling them again 
right after the record date has elapsed. As a result, a person casting 
their vote at the general meeting might not be the ‘actual’ shareholder. 
The admissibility of these votes and their effects have been discussed 
in well-known judicial cases. 
Having noticed a rise of abusive situations created by using empty 
voting techniques at the EU level, the revised Transparency Directive 
set out to deal with these issues. It entered into force on 26 November 
2013 with the deadline for implementation set at 26 November 2015. 
However, since the Transparency Directive is a minimum harmoni-
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sation Directive, Member States have substantial liberty in its imple-
mentation which might lead to a divergent level of investor protection. 
Further, since the development of capital markets leads to the ap-
pearance of new forms of derivatives and other financial instruments 
which could create an ‘empty voting’ effect, EU Member States would 
be tempted to set rules that would, as far as possible, embrace all 
forms of empty voting in a so-called ‘catch all’ provision. 
This paper aims to examine how national legislators of the EU Member 
States have dealt with the issue of empty voting in light of the solu-
tions provided in the Shareholders Rights Directive of 2007 and in the 
revised EU Transparency Directive of 2013. 
 
1 Introduction
One of the fundamental principles of company law is the principle 
of the indivisibility of a share.1 This means that voting rights (‘control 
rights’) and economic interests (‘economic rights’ or ‘ownership rights’) 
are intrinsically bound up in a single share. However, there are different 
strategies of decoupling the voting rights from cash flow rights, which 
is contrary to the principle of the indivisibility of the share.2 The impor-
tance of voting rights attached to shares is significant. When exercising 
voting rights, a shareholder directly takes part in the decision-making 
process and thereby indirectly influences the market value of the com-
pany’s shares.        
It is well known that institutional investors, hedge funds,3 and banks 
simultaneously hold the shares of various (listed) companies. The more 
votes they hold, the more influence they have at the general meeting. 
Building up their voting share portfolio could be done in various ways. 
Since the quantity of their holdings in shares affects their exposure to 
the (investment) risk, they prefer to avoid risk exposure whenever pos-
sible. It is a widely known practice that they can avoid their shareholder 
1 The principle of the indivisibility of a share is explicitly prescribed in Art 163(7) of the 
Croatian Companies Act, Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, No 111/93, 34/99, 
52/00, 118/03, 107/07, 146/08, 137/09, 125/11, 152/11, 111/12, 68/13. The same is 
prescribed in Art 8(5) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), Art 8(5) of the Austrian 
Stock Corporation Act, Art L 228-5 of the French Commercial Code, Art 2347(1) of the Ital-
ian Civil Code and Art 66(1) of the Spanish Corporations Act. 
2 K Schmidt and M Lutter, Aktiengesetz Kommentar (Verlag Dr Otto Schmidt 2008) 1549-
1550 pointed out that the shareholders’ right in a company cannot be separated from the 
voting right. U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (11th edn, CH Beck 2014) 26-27.
3 As Ringe points out ‘empty voting is a strategy, mostly used by activist hedge funds, 
to eliminate economic risk from share ownership’. WG Ringe, ‘Empty Voting Revisited: 
The Telus Saga’ (2013) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 18 <http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2230528> accessed 23 April 2015.
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status even before a decision is rendered, leaving the investment risk 
to other shareholders. There are various techniques that enable share-
holders to acquire voting control in a company, without exposing them 
to investment risk. A shareholder with reduced exposure to risk retains 
his/her voting power and his/her influence in the company, but does not 
bear the risk of negative returns. Ringe calls this strategy ‘negative de-
coupling’. There is also ‘positive decoupling’.4 This happens when an in-
stitutional investor wants to acquire an economic interest in a company 
without gaining voting power. Hu and Black5 use the term ‘empty voting’ 
for ‘negative decoupling’ whereas the reverse situation is called ‘hidden 
ownership’.6 Institutional investors such as hedge funds try to ‘discon-
nect the relationship between equity and risk’,7 and the modern capital 
market offers many techniques to achieve these goals. 
Empty voting refers to voting by a shareholder without a correspond-
ing financial interest in the company in which the shareholder votes.8 If 
a shareholder has an economic interest (investment risk) in the company 
in which he/she votes, his/her voting is aligned with the interests of 
the company. If such an interest is non-existent, so is the risk, and the 
person may vote freely as he/she pleases. The phrase empty voting de-
rives from the idea that the shareholder’s vote has been emptied of the 
economic consequences that he/she would typically face as a sharehold-
er.9 The reverse situation is ‘hidden ownership’ (or ‘positive decoupling’) 
where a party is not the shareholder but is entitled to exercise influ-
ence and eventually votes as if he/she were a shareholder. In practice, 
the holder of the financial instrument becomes economically exposed to 
fluctuations in the price of the share, and may informally bring his/her 
influence to bear on whoever holds the voting right. For this reason, the 
situation in question is also defined as ‘a combination of a non-disclosed 
4 WG Ringe, ‘Hedge Funds and Risk-Decoupling: The Empty Voting Problem in the Eu-
ropean Union’ (2012) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 52 <http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2135489 > accessed 20 April 2015.
5 H Hu and B Black, ‘The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Owner-
ship’ (2006) 79 Southern California Law Review 811.
6 H Hu and B Black, ‘Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Im-
plications, and Reforms’ (2006) 61 The Business Lawyer 1011-1070; Hu and Black (n 5) 
811-908; H Hu and B Black, ‘Hedge Funds, Insiders, and Empty Voting: Decoupling of Eco-
nomic and Voting Ownership in Public Companies’ (2007) 15 Journal of Corporate Finance 
343-367; H Hu and B Black ‘Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance 
and Extensions’ (2008) 156 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 625-739. 
7 Ringe (n 4) 2. 
8 European Corporate Governance Forum, ‘Statement on Empty Voting and Transparency 
of Shareholder Positions’ (20 February 2010) ˂http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/com-
pany/docs/ecgforum/ecgf_empty_voting_en.pdf ˂ accessed 05 July 2014. 
9 JM Barry, JW Hatfield and SD Kominers, ‘On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: 
A Theory of Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership’ Virginia Law Review (2013) 99(1103) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2134458> accessed 03 July 2014.
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economic interest joined with a probable informal voting power’.10 Gen-
erally, it is exercised by using financial derivatives, of which the equity 
swap is the most common example. 
Empty voting has attracted the attention of the courts and academ-
ics during the past few years. The latest example is the Telus case involv-
ing a Canadian Telecommunications Company which became the target 
of the US hedge fund Mason Capital. The battle between Telus and Mason 
continued in the courtroom and resulted in two differing court rulings.11 
The last one by the Supreme Court relied more on the rules which permit 
the court to assess the fairness of the proposed solutions. However, in the 
dispute brought (previously) to the Court of Appeal, the subject matter 
of the dispute was regulated by very firm rules, leaving the court with no 
room for a functional approach to the problem.
2 Empty voting strategies 
The European Corporate Governance Forum (ECGF), in its State-
ment on Empty Voting and Transparency of Shareholder Positions of 
2010,12 pointed out many techniques allowing empty voting. In the doc-
trine, three main strategies are known: borrowing shares / share lend-
ing, use of financial derivatives, especially equity swaps, and record date 
capture, ie buying or lending shares on a date close to the registration 
date. Record date capture means that shares are traded in the period 
between the record and voting date, and then sold back right after the 
record date. This means that the person who votes at the general meet-
ing does not need to be the ‘actual’ shareholder at the moment when the 
voting occurs.   
10 European Commission, ‘Impact assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2004/109/EC 
on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers 
whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market’ - Commission staff working 
paper (25 October 2011) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/registre/docs_autres_institu-
tions/commission_europeenne/sec/2011/1279/COM_SEC(2011)1279_EN.pdf> accessed 
10 July 2014; Hu and Black (n 5) 817; Hu and Black ‘Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) 
Ownership’ (n 6) 1014; H Fleischer and KU Schmolke, ‘Zum beabsichtigten Ausbau der ka-
pitalmarktrechtlichen Beteiligungstransparenz bei modernen Finanzinstrumenten (§§ 25, 
25a DiskE-WpHG)’ (2010) 22 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 847.
11 In TELUS Corporation v Mason Capital Management LLC 2012 BCCA 403, the Court of 
Appeal for British Colombia held that Mason’s risk exposure and its potential status as 
‘empty voter’ did not allow the first instance court to disregard the valid calling of the meet-
ing. The court held that it is ‘...not in a position to take into account the risk exposure for 
purposes of assessing whether Mason was allowed to call a meeting’. In a different vein, the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, in Re TELUS Corporation, 2012 BCSC 1919, approved 
the plan of arrangement as proposed by Telus. It ruled that the ‘empty voting’ situation 
was indeed one of the factors that had to be taken into account for assessing whether the 
proposed arrangement (conversion) would be fair for all shareholders, including the hedge 
fund Telus. See Ringe (n 3) 2.
12 European Corporate Governance Forum (n 8).
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2.1 Use of financial derivatives to reduce or eliminate investment 
risk 
The financial industry has developed a number of instruments that 
reduce or even eliminate exposure to shareholder investment risk and 
shift the risk to another market participant. Equity swap derivatives 
are suitable to transfer the entire risk of share price movements to the 
market participant, often called short party. An equity swap can be set-
tled in equity or in cash. The latter is known as cash-settled derivatives 
(hereinafter: CSDs). According to Conac,13 the CSD is a financial contract 
between an investor (long party) and an investment bank (short party), 
transferring the investment risk to the short party. If the price of the 
share rises, on the date of the termination of the contract the investor 
(shareholder) receives the difference between the price of the share at the 
time the contract was entered into and the price of the share at the end of 
the contract, as well as any dividend paid by the company. In exchange, 
the investor is to pay a fee, as well as the corresponding interest for the 
contract, and to compensate the short party if the price of the share has 
fallen below the price set at the beginning of the contract. CSDs, be-
sides equity swaps,14 may take many forms: as options,15 contracts for 
difference, etc. In a typical cash-settled equity swap, the long equity side 
(‘the equity leg’) acquires economic interest in the shares (but not vot-
ing rights) from the short side (‘the interest leg’). The combined position 
(long shares, short equity swaps) conveys voting rights without financial 
interest. Conversely, a long equity swap position conveys financial inter-
est without ‘formal’ voting rights. Since the swap is the future contract, 
at the moment the swap matures its settlement is possible in cash (cash 
13 PH Conac, ‘Cash-Settled Derivatives as a Takeover Instrument and the Reform of the EU 
Transparency Directive’ in HS Birkmose, M Neville and KE Sørensen (eds), The European Fi-
nancial Market in Transition (Kluwer Law International 2012); ES de Nardis and M Tonello, 
‘Know Your Shareholders: The Use of Cash-Settled Equity Derivatives to Hide Corporate 
Ownership Interests’ (2010) Conference Board Director Notes No DN-009 <http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1648526> accessed 11 July 2014; M Sauter, ‘Anschleischen an Übernah-
meziele mit Hilfe von Aktienderivaten’ in T Baums, Governance und Anlegerschutz (Mohr 
Siebeck 2013) 588; S James, The Law of Derivatives (LLP Publishing 1999) 8.  
14 The most common forms of swaps are interest rate swaps and currency swaps. See more 
in F Caputo Nassetti, I contratti derivati finanziari (2nd edn, Giuffrè Editore 2011) 23; S Das, 
Swaps and Financial Derivatives (2nd edn, The Law Book Company Limited 1994) 52-79; SK 
Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives (Elsevier 2003) 33. From the point of view of Croatian 
law, see Z Slakoper and M Beroš Božina, ‘Ugovor o valutnom i kamatnom swapu’ (2009) 
30(2) Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci 944-985. On total return swaps (TRS) 
and their role in takeovers, see D Stanković, ‘Use of Cash-Settled Derivatives in Public 
Takeovers: A Challenge for Legislators, Regulators and Courts’ (2012) <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2290899> accessed 11 July 2014; D Christ, Barausgleichsderivate und das An-
schleichen an Zielgesellschaften (Nomos 2011) 46-49.
15 Options are derivatives entitling the long party to either buy (call options) or sell (put 
options) the underlying asset in the future. F Bolliger, ‘Wettartige Finanzprodukte – wo ist 
die Grenze?, Zum Differenzeinwand im Anlagegeschäft’ in LD Loacker and C Zellweger-
Gutkneckt (eds), Differenzierung als Legitimationsfrage (Dike Verlag AG 2012) 217-221.
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settled) or in shares (equity settled), depending on the style of the swap. If 
the investor settles ‘physically’ ie in shares, he/she may, at once, acquire 
a block of voting rights large enough to gain control, without necessarily 
being a shareholder prior to the settlement or without being a sharehold-
er in a minor percentage. Ringe16 points out how a similar result can be 
achieved by applying option contracts. The shareholder may use a short 
call (ie the sale of a right to purchase) or a long put (ie the purchase of a 
right to sell), or even simply apply short selling. 
An equity swap was applied as an empty voting strategy in the fa-
mous Mylan / Perry case when Mylan and Perry were struggling over a 
target – King Pharmaceuticals. In that case, the hedge fund Perry Corp 
owned a large position in King Pharmaceuticals.17 On 26 July 2004 
Mylan Laboratories announced an agreement to acquire shares of King 
Pharmaceuticals through a stock-for-stock merger at a significant pre-
mium over King’s trading price.18 While being a significant shareholder in 
King, Perry wanted to benefit from the acquisition. Since it was unclear 
whether the merger would be beneficial for Mylan,19 when the deal was 
announced King shares rose but Mylan shares dropped. While the pro-
posed acquisition was subject to the approval of both Mylan’s and King’s 
general meeting, Perry began an unusual strategy – they acquired 9.9% 
of Mylan shares20 to help Mylan receive the shareholders’ approval for the 
merger.21 In order to remove any risk of a drop in the Mylan share price, 
Perry Corp entered into total return equity swaps with third parties, and 
as a result was able to vote in favour of the merger without fearing any 
potential economic risk as the holder of Mylan shares.22
16 Ringe (n 4) 7.
17 See more in Hu and Black, ‘Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership’ (n 6) 
1015; D Yermack, ‘Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance’ (2010) <http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1523562> accessed 03 July 2014; I Theusinger 
and D Möritz, ‘Empty Voting als moderner Stimmenkauf?’ (2010) 16 Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht 607; M Wright, DS Siegel, K Keasey and I Filatotchev (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Corporate Governance (OUP 2013) 577.
18 The proposed transaction provided that King shareholders would receive 0.9 shares of 
Mylan common stock for each outstanding share of King stock, which represented a 61% 
premium for King shareholders as of the date of the announcement. 
19 Mylan shareholders, including activist Carl Icahn, publicised their intention to vote 
against their firm’s proposed acquisition.
20 A second hedge fund, Citadel, acquired another 4.4% of Mylan shares and was ru-
moured to have followed a strategy similar to Perry. See more in Hu and Black, ‘Empty 
Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership’ (n 6) 1024-1025.
21 Since the Perry Corp hedge fund did not have any economic risk in Mylan shares, it 
intended to vote in favour of the transaction, even though such a vote would likely have 
helped drive the Mylan share price down. Moreover, the more Mylan (over)paid for King 
Pharmaceuticals shares, the more the Perry Corp hedge fund would profit. However, Mylan 
abandoned the acquisition because of accounting problems at King.
22 It is also necessary to point out that the Perry Corp hedge fund did not notify on acquir-
ing shares and therefore violated regulations in Section 13(d) SEA of 1934, ie Rule 13d-1 
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2.2 Share lending / borrowing 
According to Ringe, 
the notion of ‘share lending’ is slightly misleading, because it de-
scribes a transaction where securities are not just ‘lent’ and then 
re-transferred, but rather, one party transfers the ownership of nu-
merous securities to another, and at a later time, is returned a cor-
responding number of shares.23 
Technically speaking, this strategy resembles more a repurchase 
agreement than simple borrowing. When borrowing is in question, the 
title remains with the lender. The same author points out that it is crucial 
to understand that the legal structure necessarily implies a transfer of 
ownership between the lender and the borrower, and that the borrower 
also acquires the voting right attached to the share.24 As long as the bor-
rower does not return the shares to the lender, the lender ‘keeps’ the 
beneficial ownership rights in the company while the borrower acquires 
temporary control.25 From the company’s viewpoint, the borrower is con-
sidered a shareholder whereas the lender and the borrower agree upon 
the duration of the agreement, the dividend pay-out, and other relevant 
aspects in the contract.26 The fact that the borrower of the share acquires 
the voting right, whereas the economic benefits, in accordance with the 
contract, are transferred to the lender of the share, leads to empty voting 
– ie the misalignment of voting rights and respective economic benefits 
compared to the total number of shares one person holds.27 The borrower 
may acquire shares solely with the aim of gaining the voting right at the 
general meeting, and then returning the lent shares back to the lender.28 
and had to pay a fine of $150,000. For more on this case, see US Securities and Exchange 
Commission, ‘SEC Charges Perry Corp with Disclosure Violations in Vote Buying Scheme’ 
(press release, 21 July 2009)  at ˂http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-165.htm˂ 
accessed 07 July 2014.  
23 Ringe (n 4) 9.
24 M Mittermeyer, Empty Voting – Risikoentleerte Stimmrechtsausübung im Recht der 
börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaft (Walter De Gruyter 2014) 8.
25 See more in A Baumbach and KJ Hopt, Handelsgesetzbuch (36th edn, CH Beck 2014) 
T/1-T/3; A Zubović, ‘Stjecanje glasačke kontrole nad uvrštenim društvom’ (Doctoral dis-
sertation, University of Zagreb 2012) 322-329; H Schimansky, HJ Bunte, HJ Lwowski, 
Bankrechts-Handbuch (4th edn, CH Beck 2011) Rn 3.
26 Mittermeyer (n 24) 101.
27 An increased volume of stock lending around annual meeting record dates has been 
noticed. This is particularly evident in the UK. Furthermore, research conducted in the 
USA points to a high percentage of share borrowing – up to 20% of an individual company’s 
shares. See Hu and Black, ‘Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership’ (n 6) 1028.
28 The loan is typically callable at any time by the lender and repayable at any time by the 
borrower. R Aggarwal, PAC Saffi and J Sturgess, ‘Does Proxy Voting Affect the Supply and/
or Demand for Securities Lending?’ (2011) <http://www2.lebow.drexel.edu/PDF/Docs/
140 Edita Čulinović-Herc, Antonija Zubović: Tackling Empty Voting in the EU: The Shareholders...
There are many collateral issues in respect of share borrowing / 
lending. Regarding the admissibility of voting on the basis of borrowed 
shares, there are some contrasting views. While OECD does not hold this 
to be an issue,29 the Securities Lending and Repo Committee is of the 
opinion that ‘lenders should also consider their corporate governance re-
sponsibilities before lending stock over a period in which an AGM or EGM 
is expected to be held’.30 
Another aspect, whether the borrower is obliged to vote according to 
the lender’s instructions, is addressed by the Global Master Securities 
Lending Agreement (hereinafter: GMSLA), designed by the International 
Stock Lending Association (hereinafter: ISLA).31 The borrower is gener-
ally not obliged to vote according to the lender’s instructions, but this 
could be agreed upon differently.32 However, even if the borrower votes 
contrary to the lender’s instructions, such voting is considered valid vis-
à-vis the company and as such does not affect the validity of the decision 
rendered on the basis of that vote. If the shares are held by the company 
itself (also known as treasured shares), the question is whether they are 
suitable for lending. Article 22(1) of the Second Company Law Directive33 
provides that the shares held by the issuing company itself are exempted 
from voting for the whole period during which the shares are treasured 
shares. Companies might have good reason to lend treasured shares in 
order to obtain certain revenue. While the general view is that the bor-
CorpGov/2011Conf/AGGARWAL_Saffi_Sturgess_Proxy_Voting_and_Securities_Lending.
pdf> accessed 21 July 2014, emphasize an increased demand for borrowing shares around 
the time of the record date.  
29 OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, ‘The Role of Private Pools of Capital in 
Corporate Governance: Summary and Main Findings about the Role of Private Equity Firms 
and ‘Activist’ Hedge Funds’ (May 2007) ˂http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategov-
ernanceprinciples/38672168.pdf˂ accessed 27 April 2015.
30 Securities Lending and Repo Committee, ‘Securities Borrowing and Lending Code of 
Guidance’ (December 2004) ˂http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/pages/gilts/slrc.
aspx˂ accessed 04 July 2014. See also International Securities Lending Association, ‘Se-
curities Lending & Corporate Governance’ (December 2000) ˂http://www.lseg.com/sites/
default/files/content/documents/securities-cg.pdf˂ accessed 13 April 2015.
31 International Stock Lending Association, ‘Global Master Securities Lending Agreement’ 
(2010)<http://www.isla.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/GMSLA_2010_amend-
ments_July_2012-1.pdf˂ accessed 22 November 2015.
32 According to the Securities Borrowing and Lending Code of Guidance applied in the UK, 
the lender and the borrower define terms of acquiring voting right at the general meeting in 
the signed agreement. See further in  P Santella and others, ‘Comparative Analysis of the 
Legal Obstacles to Institutional Investor Activism in the EU and in the US’ (2009) ˂http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1137491˂ accessed 14 July 2014, published also in (2012) 23 Euro-
pean Business Law Review.
33 Council Directive (EEC) 77/91 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of 
the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within 
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation 
of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, 
with a view to making such safeguards equivalent [1977] OJ L26/1. 
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rower acquires full legal title to the shares (although on a temporary 
basis), the company lending the treasured shares might thereby activate 
(otherwise) blocked voting rights. As the decision to lend the treasured 
shares is taken by the board of directors, the board might decide to lend 
them in order to influence the outcome of a general meeting.34 Instead 
of prohibiting all forms of lending of treasured shares, the ECGF recom-
mends35 the adoption of a rule that the company and its subsidiaries 
may lend the company’s own shares only if the lending agreement stipu-
lates that the borrower will not vote with these shares, and could ensure 
that third parties acquiring the title in the (borrowed) shares will not 
vote either. The company should disclose prior to the general meeting to 
what extent it and its subsidiaries have lent the company’s own shares 
to third parties. 
Borrowed shares were used as an instrument for empty voting in 
the Lindner case, decided before the German Federal Supreme Court in 
2009,36 where, through a securities lending agreement, the shares of the 
partnership company limited by shares were lent to a limited partner, 
who thereby acquired a stake exceeding 95% in the share capital and 
demanded the initiation of a squeeze-out procedure. The German Su-
preme Court was of the opinion that a squeeze out based on securities 
lending does not amount to abusive practice, while a lending agreement 
should not give the borrower ‘share ownership of a second class’, but full 
ownership of the ‘borrowed’ shares. Another example is the Laxey Part-
ners / British Land case. Shortly before the general meeting of British 
Land in 2002, the hedge fund Laxey Partners37 (UK) announced that they 
had tripled their equity stake in it (from 2.9 to 9%). Laxey Partners did 
not support the re-election of the British Land chairman. Even though 
Laxey’s proposals did not succeed,38 the case showed voting manipula-
tion through borrowed shares. It was questionable whether the Laxey 
Partners Fund had any other hidden interests connected with British 
34 See more in E Wymeersch, ‘Shareholder(s) Matter(s)’ in Festschrift für Klaus J Hopt: Un-
ternehmen, Markt und Verantwortung (Walter De Gruyter 2010) 1573, 1575. 
35 Commission (EC), ‘The review of the operation of Directive 2004/109/EC: Emerging 
issues. Accompanying document to the Report from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions Operation of Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transpar-
ency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted 
to trading on a regulated market’ COM (2010) 243, 27 May 2010 <http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/securities/docs/transparency/directive/sec-2010_611_en.pdf> accessed 
7 April 2015. 
36 Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court), judgment of 16 March 2009 (II ZR 302/06), 
BGHZ 180, 154. 
37 The Laxey Partners Hedge Fund is a subsidiary company to Laxey Partners Ltd.
38 The three institutions that lent out shares, Hermes, Barclays Global Investors, and Scot-
tish Widows, apologised to British Land.
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Land shares, especially relating to the share market price in a way that 
would generate additional profit for them by means of a share refund.39
On a more practical level, it should be emphasised that share lending 
is available at low cost (although high security payments are to be made 
to the lender who is not willing to bear the default risk of the borrower).40 
Because of various incentives given to the lenders, only a tiny fraction of 
all share loans are recalled (not more than 2% of all lent shares).41 
2.3 Trading / borrowing shares in the period between the record 
date and the voting date (record date capture)
When shares are traded (or borrowed) in the period between the re-
cord date and voting date, this may lead to empty voting. 
The record date is the cut-off date for registering for the general 
meeting. Since the record date is generally not set at the date of the gen-
eral meeting (but some time before), this allows voters (registered share-
holders) to sell shares before the general meeting but to vote as if they 
were regular shareholders. According to the record date method, share-
holders are solely persons who hold shares on the day the general meet-
ing is held or within a specific timeframe before the general meeting is 
called. The other method is reconciliation42 – putting share transactions 
on hold, but that method does not encourage shareholders to exercise 
their voting rights at all.43    
When applying the record date system, a specific date before the 
shareholder’s meeting is set in advance as the date (often close to the vot-
ing date) on which the person who intends to vote at the general meeting 
must be identified as a shareholder.44 After the shareholders’ registra-
39 Mittermeyer (n 24) 8.
40 Ringe (n 4) 13.
41 G D’Avolio, ‘The Market for Borrowing Stock’ (2002) 66 Journal of Financial Economics 
271.
42 A reconciliation requires the shareholder to hold (or even to deposit) the shares for a 
day or within a timeframe of 24 to 48 hours before voting occurs. The shareholder would 
deposit shares in a certain institution for a pre-set period of time before the voting. If non-
materialised securities are involved, authorised institutions issue a certificate stating that 
the shares held on their accounts have been blocked, about which they inform the joint 
stock companies.
43 D Jurić, ‘Pravno uređenje unutarnjeg korporacijskog upravljanja (corporate governance) 
u dioničkim društvima u hrvatskom i usporednom pravu društava’ (Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Rijeka 2005) 135; U Noack and DA Zetzsche, ‘Corporate Governance Reform 
in Germany: The Second Decade’ (2005) 16 European Business Law Review 1043.
44 In EU (as well as in US) law, the right to vote at a general meeting is tied to the shares 
held by shareholder on a specified date prior to the general meeting (the record date). Eu-
ropean Parliament and Council Directive (EC) 2007/36 on the exercise of certain rights 
of shareholders in listed companies [2007] OJ L184/17, Art 7 para 2; Latham&Watkins, 
‘“Empty Voting” and Other Fault Lines Undermining Shareholder Democracy: The New 
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tion, share transactions might freely continue. Once the registered share-
holders have been identified, they remain entitled to vote notwithstand-
ing the fact that they have meanwhile alienated their shares. When the 
record date is set very close to the date of the general meeting, investors 
who have alienated a (significant) block of shares/votes upon their reg-
istration would not notify the market about their disinvestment, which 
they should normally do within the course of a few working days. There-
fore, capital market participants could be led to believe they were actual 
shareholders.45             
3 Empty voting and the Shareholders Rights Directive
The requirements for participation and voting in a general meeting 
are prescribed in Article 7 of the Shareholders Rights Directive (herein-
after: SRD).46  
Article 7(2) SRD adopted the record date system. The record date 
must not lie more than 30 days before the date of the general meeting 
to which it applies, and at least eight days must elapse between the lat-
est permissible date for the convocation of the general meeting and the 
record date.47 Therefore, the voting right might be exercised by a person 
who is the holder of the share on a specific date prior to the general 
meeting – ie the record date.48 The provisions of the SRD eliminate the 
possibility of making the storing of shares prior to the meeting or the set-
ting of transactions on hold (reconciliation) a condition for participating 
in the general meeting and for the admissibility to vote.49 This method is 
Hunting Ground for Hedge Funds’ (M&A Deal Commentary) (2007) <http://www.lw.com/
upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1878_1.Commentary.Empty.Voting.pdf> accessed 15 July 
2014; A Brav and RD Mathews, ‘Empty Voting and the Efficiency of Corporate Governance’ 
(2010) AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108632> ac-
cessed 15 July 2014; ND Luca, ‘Titolarità vs legittimazione: a proposito di record date, 
empty voting e “proprietà nascosta” di azioni’ (2010) 2 Rivista di diritto societario 311-339.
45 On the importance of transparency rules in similar cases, see more in Commission (EC) 
(n 35) 15.
46 European Parliament and Council Directive (EC) 2007/36 on the exercise of certain 
rights of shareholders in listed companies [2007] OJ L184/17.
47 In calculating that number of days, those two dates shall not be included. The NYSE 
Listed Company Manual suggests a minimum of 30 days should elapse between the re-
cord date and voting date. NYSE Listed Company Manual (2009) <http://nysemanual.nyse.
com/lcm/> accessed 20 July 2014.
48 Shareholders Rights Directive 2007/36 Art 7(2).
49 The Shareholders Rights Directive 2007/36 Art 7(1) imposes an obligation on Member 
States to ensure that the rights of a shareholder to participate in a general meeting and to 
vote in respect of any of his/her shares are not subject to any requirement that his/her 
shares be deposited with, or transferred to, or registered in the name of another natural or 
legal person before the general meeting and that the rights of a shareholder to sell or oth-
erwise transfer his/her shares during the period between the record date and the general 
meeting to which it applies are not subject to any restriction to which they are not subject 
at other times.
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particularly inconvenient for institutional investors. Practice shows that 
institutional investors have abstained many times from voting if it was 
mandatory for them to block or to deposit shares. The liquidity risk is real 
since share blockage could be extended if the general meeting is not held 
at the first call.50 
According to the adopted provisions, disclosure of information on 
voting rights before the general meeting does not prevent empty voting.51 
However, the shorter the period of time between the record date and the 
voting date, the less likely is it for empty voting to occur.52
When companies are able to identify the names and addresses of 
their shareholders from the current register of shareholders on the day 
of the general meeting, Member States may depart from the record date 
rule.53  
Pursuant to the provision of Article 7(3) SRD, Member States must 
ensure that a single record date applies to all companies.54 However, 
Member States may set one record date for companies which have issued 
bearer shares and another record date for companies which have issued 
registered shares, provided that a single record date applies to each com-
pany which has issued both types of shares. 
Article 15 SRD imposes the obligation on Member States to com-
municate to the Commission the number of days set as the record date.55 
In order to encourage shareholders to vote, Member States are obliged to 
ensure that the proof of capacity of a shareholder is made subject only to 
such requirements that are necessary to ensure the identification of the 
shareholders and only to the extent that is proportionate for achieving 
that objective (Article 7(3) SRD). 
Croatia and Germany share a great deal in regulating the question 
of the record date. In Croatia (Article 279(2) of the Croatian Companies 
50 See more in E Čulinović Herc and D Jurić, ‘Prekogranični aspekti prava glasa – otvorena 
pitanja u europskom i hrvatskom pravu’ (2006) Zbornik radova s međunarodnog znanstve-
nog skupa Prekogranična i regionalna suradnja 221. 
51 Brav and Mathews (n 44) 7 point out that it should publish information on share trading 
between the record date and voting date.  
52 PL Davies, S Worthington and E Micheler, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Com-
pany Law, (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 465; PE Masouros, ‘Is the EU Taking Share-
holder Rights Seriously? An Essay on the Impotence of Shareholdership in Corporate Eu-
rope’ (2010) 7(5) European Company Law 198.
53 Luca (n 44) 318.
54 U Noack, ‘The Shareholder Rights Directive (Die Aktionaersrechte-Richtlinie)’ (2008) 
Festschrift für H. P. Westermann, CBC-RPS No 0034 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138735> 
accessed 06 July 2014.
55 European Commission (EC) List of days provided for according to Article 15 of Directive 
2007/36/EC [2010] OJ C285/1. 
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Act) and in Germany (Article 123(2) AktG),56 a joint-stock company in 
its articles of incorporation may require a shareholder to apply for the 
general meeting in order to be able to participate and/or vote in it.57 The 
application form should reach the company at the latest six days prior 
to the general meeting if a shorter closing date is not otherwise provided 
for in the articles of incorporation.58 If identification of the shareholder is 
required, the deadline for the convocation of a general meeting (at least 
a month prior to the date of the general meeting) is extended by the 
length of the registration (identification) period.59 As for the manner of the 
shareholder’s identification,60 both German and Croatian law differenti-
ate between the identification of the holders of bearer shares and that of 
the holders of registered shares. While the first would identify themselves 
in the manner prescribed in the company’s articles of incorporation, 
the shareholders of listed companies should provide evidence in writ-
ing issued by the depositary institution where the accounts of registered 
shares are held.61 In the case of listed companies, the evidence must refer 
to the beginning of the 21st day prior to the date of the general meeting. 
It must be received by the company at least six days prior to the general 
meeting if a shorter deadline is not otherwise prescribed in the articles 
of incorporation.62 This deadline cannot be extended by the company be-
cause this would cause shareholders difficulties in exercising their right 
to participate in the general meeting.63 Only a person who submits the 
56 Croatian Companies Act (n 1) Art 279(2). The provisions of Art 123 AktG were amended 
in 2005 and 2009. See Gesetz für Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfech-
tungsrecht (UMAG) published on 22 September 2005 (BGBl vol I, 802) and Gesetz zur Um-
setzung der Aktionärsrechterichtlinie (ARUG) published on 30 July 2009 (BGBl vol I, 2479). 
For German law, see more in KV Nussbaum, ‘Zu Nachweisstichtag (record date) und Eintra-
gungssperre bei Namensaktien’ (2009) 12 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 456-58; 
MKF Henning, Das Recht der Aktionärsversammlung in Großbritannien und Deutschland 
(Nomos 2006) 174-181.
57 The convocation of the general meeting must include the conditions to be met in order 
to take part in the general meeting and to exercise the right to vote. 
58 The date when the company receives the application is not calculated in the deadline.
59 E Čulinović Herc and T Hasić, ‘Sudjelovanje dioničara u radu glavne skupštine dioničkog 
društva prema noveli Zakona o trgovačkim društvima’ (2011) 32(1) Zbornik Pravnog 
fakulteta u Rijeci 47. The authors consider that the regulation was introduced in order not 
to shorten the month-long period shareholders usually have to decide on their participation 
in the general meeting.
60 Croatian Companies Act (n 1) Art 279(3) and Art 123(3) AktG. 
61 In Croatia, this would be the Central Depository and Clearing Company, while in Germa-
ny written proof is issued by the Depotführende Institut. These are credit institutions (Kred-
itinstitute) or financial services institutions (Finanzdienstleistungsinstitute). W Hölters, Ak-
tiengesetz Kommentar (2nd edn, CH Beck 2014) Rn 11; U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (11th edn, CH 
Beck 2014) Rn 11.
62 Croatian Companies Act (n 1) Art 279(3) and Art 123(3) AktG. The date when the com-
pany receives the application is not calculated in the deadline.
63 J Barbić and others, Novela Zakona o trgovačkim društvima iz 2007 (Novi informator 
2008) 39-40; J Barbić, ‘Sazivanje glavne skupštine i ostvarivanje prava dioničara nakon 
novele Zakona o trgovačkim društvima iz 2009’ (2010) Zbornik 48 susreta pravnika 13; F 
Ochmann, Die Aktionärsrechte-Richtlinie (De Gruyter Recht 2009) 104.
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prescribed proof is entitled to participate in the meeting and to vote.64 
Therefore, according to Croatian and German law, the mandatory record 
date is at the beginning of the 21st day prior to the general meeting (but 
only for holders of bearer shares). 
The introduction of the record date system and abandonment of the 
share blocking system for all French listed companies65 is regulated by 
a Decree of 11 December 2006.66 Article R 225-85 of the French Com-
mercial Code defines the record date as three working days prior to the 
general meeting.67 Shareholders who have already voted via mail or have 
appointed a proxy holder may sell their shares. However, if the process of 
selling shares continues in a period less than three days prior to the gen-
eral meeting, the company must consider any such vote or proxy notice 
null and void (Fr. invalide ou modifié), and in the case of bearer shares, 
the broker or bank must disclose sales information to the company or 
person in charge of the registry. If the sale is completed within three days 
prior to the general meeting, there is no obligation for such information 
disclosure. Article L 225-104 of the Commercial Code prescribes that the 
manner and deadlines for convening general meetings are determined in 
a Council of State decree (Décret en Conseil d’Etat). However, members of 
the general meeting, management and supervisory board, and permanent 
legal entity appointed representatives (Fr. le président, les directeurs gé-
néraux, les membres du directoire d’une société, les personnes physiques 
ou morales exerçant dans cette société les fonctions d’administrateur ou 
de membre du conseil de surveillance ainsi que les représentants perma-
nents des personnes morales qui exercent ces fonctions) are obliged by 
the above-mentioned decree to register, ie to store their shares or shares 
belonging to their spouses and minor children, issued by the company, 
its subsidiaries and controlling companies, if the shares in question are 
listed in the regulated securities market.68        
64 According to the Croatian Companies Act (n 1) Art 277(4), the board, ie executive direc-
tors, and if the general meeting is called by the supervisory or management board, the 
notice calling the meeting, issued by the listed company board, must include the conditions 
to be met in order to partake in the general meeting and exercise the right to vote, as up to 
the day prescribed evidence under Art 279(3) of the Companies Act is to be submitted. The 
regulation in question is prescribed in German law under Art 121(3) AktG.
65 Prior to the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive in French law, the stat-
ute was allowed to prescribe the obligation to deposit shares five days prior to the general 
meeting as a means to impose a condition for participation and voting in the general meet-
ing. See more in J Buhart and N Lafont in A Kawamura, A Mori & Tomotsune (eds), Corpo-
rate Governance, Jurisdictional Comparisons (1st edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 84.  
66 Décret No 2006-1566 du 11 décembre 2006 modifiant le Décret No 67-236 du 23 mars 
1967 sur les sociétés commerciales [2006] JORF 18762.
67 Art R 225-285 of the French Commercial Code amended by Art 4 of the Décret No 2009-
2295 du 16 mars 2009.
68 Art L 225-109 of the French Commercial Code.
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In the UK, the SRD was implemented by the Companies (Share-
holder Rights) Regulations.69 These amendments came into force on 3 
August 2009. In UK law, publicly traded companies must determine the 
right to exercise voting rights at the meeting by reference to the register 
of securities at the time specified by the company and not more than 48 
hours prior to the time set for the meeting.70 In practice, the vast majority 
of issuers choose the date as late as 18 hours before the general meet-
ing. In calculating this period, only working days are counted. Changes 
of entries in the register of securities carried out after the time specified 
by the company are disregarded in determining the rights of any person 
to attend or vote at the meeting, notwithstanding any provisions in any 
enactment, articles of incorporation or other instrument to the contrary. 
However, the company in its articles of incorporation might make the 
right to attend the general meeting conditional upon the duty to register 
and store the shares. However, such a clause should be null and void if 
it limits the shareholder’s right to attend and vote at the general meeting 
by prescribing the obligation to store or transfer shares or register them 
under another’s person’s name, or prevents the share transfer within a 
period of 48 hours prior to the general meeting.71   
In Italy, the SRD was implemented by Legislative Decree No 27 of 27 
January 2010.72 Article 2370(2) of the Italian Civil Code provides the right 
of the company to regulate the exercising of voting rights in its articles of 
incorporation. Companies whose shares are not admitted to the central 
depository (società le cui azioni non sono ammesse alla gestione accen-
trata) may require the shares to be deposited in advance (il preventivo de-
posito) at its registered office or in the banks indicated in the call for the 
general meeting. For companies whose shares, though not admitted to 
trading, are widely distributed among the public (diffuse fra il pubblico in 
69 On 24 October 2008 the UK Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Re-
form (BERR) published a document on consultation regarding the directive containing the 
UK Draft Regulations. After the completion of consultations, BERR drew up a final version 
of the Draft Regulations of 2 February 2009, SI 2009/1632, submitted to the Parliament on 
3 February 2009, altering the provisions of the Companies Act 2006. 
70 Reg 41(1) of the Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001, SI 2001/3755.
71 See more in B Hannigan and others (eds), Hannigan and Prentice: The Companies Act 
2006 – A Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths 2009) 175-176; Davies, Worthington and 
Micheler (n 52) 490.
72 Legislative Decree No 27 of 27 January 2010, Attuazione della direttiva 2007/36/CE, 
relativa all’esercizio di alcuni diritti degli azionisti di societa’ quotate, published in Official 
Gazette No 53 of 5 March 2010 - Supplemento Ordinario No 43.
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misura rilevante),73 this period cannot exceed two working days.74 There-
fore, the right to vote at the general meeting is determined by reference to 
the shares registered on the record date in favour of the shareholder on 
the relevant intermediary’s account. When the financial instruments are 
admitted for trading on the regulated market with the issuer’s consent, 
the record date for holders of such instruments is the end of the seventh 
business day prior to the date of the general meeting (Article 2370(5) of 
the Italian Civil Code and Article 83-sexies(1)(2) of the Italian Securities 
Act). Pursuant to this new regime, shareholders may attend a meeting 
and exercise voting rights in respect of those shares even if they transfer 
their shares after the record date.75 
In accordance with the solutions adopted by the Member States, 
trading shares in the period between the record and voting date is pos-
sible and allowed. This, in turn, enables empty voting with all its adverse 
consequences. Some legislators intended to limit empty voting by pre-
scribing a shorter period between the record and voting date (two working 
days in the UK, Ireland and Cyprus). However, proxies who seek instruc-
tions on how to vote usually set the date for receiving instructions on the 
cut-off date. Therefore, the less time gap there is for trading, the shorter 
is the time to receive instructions. Portugal has an interesting approach 
here. It requires the person who declares that it will attend the general 
meeting but has transferred its shares to another person in the period 
between the record and voting date to duly inform the company general 
meeting and the National Securities Market Commission (Commisão de 
Mercado de Valores Mobiliários – CMVM).76 
On April 2014 the European Commission published a proposal for 
the revision of the Shareholder Rights Directive (hereinafter: Proposal 
73 Legislative Decree No 6 of 17 January 2003, published in Official Gazette No 17 of 22 
January 2003  within ‘società che fanno ricorso al mercato del capitale di rischio’ differ-
entiates two types of company: ‘società con azioni quotate in mercati regolamentati’ and 
companies whose shares are ‘diffuse tra il pubblico in misura rilevante’. See more in N 
Ciocca, ‘Individuazione delle società con azioni diffuse tra il pubblico in misura rilevante’ in 
A Gambino, Società di capitali – Casi e materiali (G Giappichelli Editore 2006) 7.
74 F Pernazza, Corporations and Partnerships in Italy (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 
2012) 102. G Bonfante and others, Codice commentato delle societa’ (3rd edn, Ipsoa 2011) 
673 highlight the discrepancy in court rulings in cases where the prescribed conditions had 
not been met. Some courts had seen the decisions voidable, whereas others held the general 
meeting decisions null and void. 
75 N Abriani and others, Diritto delle società (Manuale breve) (5th edn, Giuffrè Editore 2012) 
195; S Di Amato, G Muscolo and G Sciumbata, Le assemblee nelle S.p.A. (Giuffrè Editore 
2011) 81; A Ferrucci and C Ferrentino, Società di capitali, società cooperative e mutue as-
sicuratrici, Tomo I (2nd edn, Giuffrè Editore 2012) 577; Luca (n 44) 327-331.  
76 AEM - Associação de Empresas Emitentes de Valores Cotados em Mercado, ‘Esma’s Call 
for Evidence on Empty Voting’ (November 2011) <http://www.emitentes.pt/images/me-
dia/docs/170_logos_526111125_AEM_EmptyVoting_RespostaConsultaPu%C5%93blica_
enviada.pdf> accessed 1 April 2015; European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), 
‘Feedback Statement Call for Evidence on Empty Voting’, available at <http://www.esma.
europa.eu/system/files/2012-415.pdf> accessed 1 April 2015. 
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SRD).77 According to the new rules, intermediaries holding shares on be-
half of shareholders would be required to disclose the contract details 
with shareholders to companies if they so requested. Such shareholder 
identification would allow listed companies to communicate directly with 
the shareholders and enable their proactive engagement. Shareholders 
might enter into discussion with the board on relevant corporate govern-
ance issues. 
Although the Proposal SRD does not preclude the occurrence of 
empty voting, it insists on the disclosure of contract details between the 
holder of the voting rights and its contracting party, which enables oth-
er shareholders to become aware of the short position of the particular 
voter. Since the basic idea of the proposed revision is not to forbid but 
to inform other shareholders about indirect holding arrangements, for a 
complete assessment of the disclosure duties one should take into ac-
count the provisions of the Transparency Directive, being the ‘master’ 
directive for the disclosure of certain blocks of voting rights.   
4 Empty voting and the (revised) Transparency Directive
It is widely known that the acquisition or alienation of certain blocks 
of voting rights in a listed company triggers the duty of the respective 
company to disclose this information to the public. Transactions involv-
ing a block of shares and pertaining voting rights give an important mar-
ket signal and therefore could cause the rise or fall of the share price. In 
order to evade the disclosure of the acquisition of voting rights, an inves-
tor may resort to the indirect acquisitions of voting rights. The investor 
might be motivated to evade disclosure especially if he/she intends to 
take over the listed company and wants the takeover bid to come as a 
surprise when he/she acquires the controlling block. If the market recog-
nises the investor’s appetite for a takeover, the price of the share would 
probably rise. The reason lies in the fact that once his/her takeover bid 
is launched, the bidder should not offer less than the market price of the 
share. The situation is described as shareholders gaining their ‘takeover 
premium’.78 By holding his/her voting portfolio through various forms 
77 The proposal has been prepared following three extensive public consultations (Com-
mission (EC) ‘Corporate governance in financial institutions’ (Green Paper) COM (2010) 
284 final, 2 June 2010; Commission (EC) 2011 ‘The EU corporate governance framework’ 
(Green Paper) COM (2011) 164 final, 5 April 2011; Commission (EC)  ‘Long-term financing 
of the EU economy’ (Green Paper) COM (2013) 150 final, 25 March 2013) and has taken 
into account the views expressed by stakeholders. The text of the proposal is available at 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1398680488759&uri=COM:2014:
213:FIN> accessed 30 October 2014. 
78 BE Eckbo, ‘Bidding Strategies and Takeover Premiums: A Review’ (2009) 15 Journal 
of Corporate Finance 149-178, also available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1198342> ac-
cessed 13 April 2015. 
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of indirect holdings, including derivatives, the intended bidder might go 
under the radar until he/she reaches the controlling stake.79 This is why 
the EU legislator has introduced special rules on the calculation of vot-
ing rights whose aim is to add certain indirect holdings to the investor’s 
direct holdings in order to force the shareholder to disclose the whole 
block.80 
In order to improve legal certainty and effectiveness, a revision of 
the provisions of the Transparency Directive of 2004 has been initiated.81 
The revised Transparency Directive entered into force on 26 November 
2013. Member States are required to adopt the necessary measures to 
transpose it into national law within two years (by 26 November 2015).82 
The disclosure rules have been extended both to include direct or 
indirect holdings of financial instruments with an economic effect similar 
to the holdings of shares, whether or not they confer a right to a physical 
79 DA Zetzsche, ‘Continental AG vs Schaeffler, Hidden Ownership and European Law: 
Matter of Law or Enforcement?’ (2009) 10 European Business Organization Law Review 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1170987> accessed 13 April 2015. 
80 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 Decem-
ber 2005 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information 
about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amend-
ing Directive 2001/34/EC [2004] OJ L390/38. See also Commission (EC) ‘Report from 
the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Operation of Directive 2004/109/EC 
on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issu-
ers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market’ COM (2010) 243 final, 
27 May 2010 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/transparency/direc-
tive/com-2010-243_en.pdf> accessed 10 July 2014. See also Commission (EC) (n 35); Com-
mittee of European Securities Regulators, ‘CESR proposal to extend major shareholding 
notifications to instruments of similar economic effect to holding shares and entitlements to 
acquire shares’ (Consultation Paper) January 2010 <http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/
files/09_1215b.pdf> accessed 1 September 2014. The Transparency Directive Assessment 
Report highlighted two ways that the empty voting issue could be managed: one is to en-
hance disclosure duties and the other is to ban empty voting. Mazars, ‘Transparency Di-
rective Assessment Report’ (2009) <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/
transparency/report-application_en.pdf> accessed 5 October 2014.
81 On 25 October 2011, the European Commission proposed amendments to the Trans-
parency Directive of 2004.  Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market’ COM (2011) 683 final, 25 October 2011 <http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0683:FIN:EN:PDF> accessed 
26 July 2014.
82 Directive 2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
2013 amending Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the harmonization of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers 
whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, Directive 2003/71/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be published when secu-
rities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and Commission Directive 2007/14/
EC laying down detailed rules for the implementation of certain provisions of Directive 
2004/109/EC [2013] OJ L294/13, Art 4.
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settlement. The new definition focuses on the economic effect of the ap-
plied financial instrument rather than enumerating the types of financial 
instruments covered. This catch-all provision will cover all derivatives, 
financial instruments and contracts.83  
According to the revised Transparency Directive, the holder must 
calculate and notify all financial instruments relating to the same issuer. 
However, to avoid any confusion as to the nature of the holdings, the 
holder of shares and financial instruments should in the notification sep-
arately disclose the amount of holdings of shares and the amount of hold-
ings of financial instruments, respectively. The newly adopted solution 
enables the investor community to comprehend with a greater amount 
of probability the position of the shareholder: is the one who is holding 
positions in financial derivatives a long or short investor and how will 
this influence his/her voting. In a similar vein, the revised Transparency 
Directive also leads to greater harmonisation of the calculation rules.84 
As far as empty voters are concerned, it is worth emphasising that 
only long positions are to be taken into account for the calculation of 
voting rights. Also, in accordance with the adopted rules, long positions 
cannot be netted off against short positions relating to the same under-
lying issuer.85 Article 13.a(2) of the Transparency Directive requires the 
voting rights that have already been notified to be notified again when 
the natural person or the legal entity has acquired the underlying shares 
83 In accordance with the adopted rules, financial instruments cover options, transferable 
securities, futures, swaps, forward rate agreements, contracts for differences and any other 
contracts or agreements with similar economic effects which may be settled physically or in 
cash if they satisfy any of the conditions set out in Art 13(1)(a) and (b) of the Transparency 
Directive. In addition, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is obliged to 
establish an indicative list of financial instruments that are subject to notification require-
ments taking into account technical developments on financial markets. For more about 
ESMA’s position, see L Degabriel, ‘ESMA’s Role in the Supervision of Transparency Require-
ments’ (2014) 5 Zeitschrift für Internationale Rechnungslegung 193-195. 
84 The implementation of Art 13 of the Transparency Directive of 2004 differs in the EU 
Member States. One group of states (Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, Luxembourg, Italy, 
and Poland) are of the view that disclosure pertaining to Art 13 should be viewed separately 
from disclosure duties arising under Art 9. The second group of states (Belgium, Germany, 
Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Great Britain, Norway and Ireland) has obliged 
investors to add voting rights from shares to the voting rights from other financial instru-
ments in order to verify whether the threshold prescribed in Art 9 of the Directive has been 
exceeded. CESR, ESMA’s predecessor, held in 2005 that coupling those blocks is not neces-
sary. See the Committee of European Securities Regulators, ‘CESR’s Final Technical Advice 
on Possible Implementing Measures of the Transparency Directive’ (June 2005) <http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/prospectus/cesr-05-407_en.pdf> accessed 
10 March 2015. The newly adopted regulation introduces stricter demands. 
85 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 
2005 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about 
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Di-
rective 2001/34/EC [2004] OJ L390/38, Art 13 (1b).
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and such acquisitions result in the total number of voting rights reaching 
or exceeding the threshold laid down by Article 9(1) of the Transparency 
Directive. 
Although the motivation for the proposed modifications was investor 
protection, the additional costs related to the disclosure of information 
may not be welcomed by market participants and may in turn trigger the 
lowering of the value of shares.86    
Article 10 of the Transparency Directive is relevant for empty voting 
through the practices of lending or borrowing shares. The review of the 
operation of the Transparency Directive indicated that 55.9% of share-
holders believe that the lending of voting rights should be made trans-
parent, and the majority of shareholders (65.6%) took the position that 
borrowed voting rights should be included in the calculation of the voting 
threshold that triggers the notification duties.87
However, the issue of borrowed shares in the revised Transparency 
Directive has not been addressed explicitly. So a question remains con-
cerning what the ground provision is for imposing the duty to calculate 
borrowed shares, and who is obliged to disclose the transaction – the 
borrower or the lender? 
The duty to aggregate borrowed shares stems from Article 10, while 
Article 9 calls for disclosure. Any natural person or legal entity, to the ex-
tent they are entitled to acquire, to dispose of or to exercise voting rights 
held by a third party under an agreement concluded with that person or 
entity providing for the temporary transfer for consideration of the voting 
rights in question, is under the duty to disclose. The provision is struc-
tured in a way that the person transferring his/her voting right (tempo-
rarily and for consideration) remains the holder of the securities. He/she 
has transferred his/her voting right only and for consideration. If voting 
rights are transferred without consideration, this rule is inapplicable. If 
the parties conclude a repurchase agreement, the person who purchased 
the shares does not exercise the voting right of the other person, but ac-
quires their own voting right, which would be returned (sold back) on a 
date set in the contract. Since this is short-term share acquisition, the 
person might use the ‘repo’ shares to cast a vote against the company’s 
86 Market research shows that an increase in the amount of information a company is 
obliged to disclose causes a decrease in its share value. For more on this issue, see DA 
Zetzsche, ‘Against Mandatory Disclosure of Economic-Only Positions Referenced to Shares 
of European Issuers: Twenty Arguments Against the CESR Proposal’ (2011) 11(2) Europe-
an Business Organization Law Review <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1559787> accessed 27 
July 2014; Barry, Hatfield and Kominers (n 9) 11; R Scalcione, The Derivatives Revolution: A 
Trapped Innovation and a Blueprint for Regulatory Reform (Kluwer Law International 2011) 
274-275.
87 Commission (EC) (n 35) 80. 
153CYELP 11 [2015] 133-160
interest, while, due to the sell back right / obligation, they would not 
bear any economic consequence of their vote. The investment risk and 
economic consequences of the vote cast by the temporary ‘repo’ share-
holder would pertain to the shareholder who would buy back the shares 
in question.                
According to the Transparency Directive Assessment Report,88 a typ-
ical stock lending agreement results in a transfer of the shareholder’s 
rights from the lender to the borrower. This is applicable both to the 
bearer and the registered shares. The working group took the position 
that borrowing shares transactions are covered by the transparency obli-
gation as stipulated in Article 9 of the Transparency Directive.  
The question concerning which contracting party is to disclose 
the acquisition – the lender and/or borrower – has divided the Member 
States. The Transparency Directive Assessment Report stated that, since 
Article 9 of the Directive is applicable, the transaction should be notified 
both by the lender and the borrower. By imposing a notification obli-
gation on both contracting parties, the market would be provided with 
complete and consistent information about the concluded transaction.89 
On the one hand, the lender would disclose his/her shift from full owner 
to holder of a right to re-acquire the shares, and, on the other hand, the 
borrower would declare his/her status as owner and his/her obligation 
to return the shares. 
Article 10(b) of the Transparency Directive is applicable if the ‘voting 
rights held by a third party are acquired under an agreement concluded 
with that person or entity’. While the form of the agreement is not pre-
scribed, all forms are eligible (ie oral, written, etc). This raises the ques-
tion whether this provision is meant to cover situations where an agree-
ment does not provide for the transfer of voting rights but such transfer 
may be the logical consequence of the agreement. Moreover, Article 10(g) 
of the Transparency Directive states that the notification obligation ap-
plies to ‘voting rights held by a third party in its own name on behalf of 
that person or entity’.90  
The provisions of the Transparency Directive have not been trans-
posed with exactly the same content in all EU Member States.91 Relat-
ing to the issue of whether or not a loan agreement triggers the duty to 
88 Mazars (n 80) 124. 
89 Commission (EC) (n 35) 82.
90 The provision of Art 10(g) of the Transparency Directive is implemented in Croatian law 
by Art 417(1)(7) of the Croatian Capital Market Act which explicitly prescribes ‘voting rights 
held by a third party in its own name on behalf of that person or entity’. 
91 The issue is addressed by H Fleischer and U Schmolke, ‘Die Reform der Transparenz-
richtlinie: Mindest- oder Vollharmonisierung der kapitalmarktrechtlichen Beteiligungspub-
lizität?’ (2010) 32 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 1241-1243.
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notify, the Member States have declared the affirmative. However, they 
have adopted various standpoints concerning which subject has the duty 
to notify.         
In Croatia, Article 10(b) of the Transparency Directive was imple-
mented in Article 417(1) of the Capital Market Act (hereinafter: CMA). The 
issue of who has the obligation to notify should be viewed in respect of the 
provision in Article 413 CMA. According to this provision, disclosure is 
compulsory for both the lender and the borrower. Each person to whom 
the obligation applies is individually required to notify the issuer and the 
Agency pursuant to Article 413 CMA, although the CMA allows a sin-
gle common notification by both parties. Croatian law does not explicitly 
regulate disclosure of voting rights acquired under financial derivatives.
In Germany, the relevant provision is Article 21ff of the Securities 
Trading Act (WpHG).92 In the doctrine, different views have been ex-
pressed as to the question of which side has the obligation to notify. Prior 
to the last amendment, the common standpoint was that, pursuant to 
Article 22 WpHG, the lender was obliged to notify about the holdings of 
the shares transferred to the borrower.93 The view was expressed that 
the voting rights should be added to those of the borrower when the bor-
rower was the one exercising voting rights. Led by both arguments, case 
law has adopted a standpoint where, for the purpose of notifying, pursu-
ant to Article 22(1) WpHG, voting rights are attributed to the lender, but 
only in the case where the lender is able to influence the voting. In the 
very well-known case decided by the German Federal Supreme Court in 
2009,94 a major shareholder in a partnership company limited by shares 
reached the 95% threshold by entering into a lending agreement and 
92 Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG) in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung, published on 9 
September 1998, BGBl vol I, 2708, as last amended by Art 2 of the law of 1 April 2015, BGBl 
vol I, 434.
93 A Merkner and M Sustmann, ‘Wertpapierleihe und Empty Voting – Weitergehender 
Transparenzbedarf im WpHG?’ (2010) 30 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 1171. 
94 Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court), judgment of 16 March 2009 (II ZR 302/06) 
BGHZ 180, 154.The plaintiffs were minority shareholders of the defendant (a partnership 
company limited by shares) Lindner Holding KGaA, whose founder and General Partner 
was JL. In 2004 he held approximately 1.19% of the shares of the defendant. Approximately 
31.33% were held by JL GmbH (in which he was 100% owner and managing director). 
Approximately 62.59% of the shares were held by L Beteiligungs-GmbH whose members 
were the wife and daughters of JL. Through a securities lending agreement of 18 October 
2004, JL and JL GmbH lent their shares to L Beteiligungs-GmbH (for an indefinite period 
of time) (the first time) terminating on 30 June 2007. By a letter dated 19 October 2004, L 
Bet.-GmbH showed the defendant that his stake had grown to more than 95% in the share 
capital and demanded the initiation of the squeeze-out procedure according to Art 327a et 
seq AktG. An Extraordinary General Meeting of the defendant was called on 25 February 
2005, and the squeeze-out decision was rendered by granting cash compensation to mi-
nority shareholders of €28.52 per share.  BGH held that the request of the defendants was 
founded. BGH was of the opinion that securities lending does not give the borrower ‘share 
ownership of a second class’ but full ownership of the ‘borrowed’ shares. 
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afterwards initiated a squeeze out of minority shareholders. Although 
lower instance courts found this practice abusive, the German Federal 
Supreme Court ruled that the borrower, by virtue of the lending agree-
ment, had acquired full (although temporary) ownership of the borrowed 
shares, which could not be understood as abusive, so the court ulti-
mately upheld the squeeze-out procedure. The German legislator sought 
to tackle the issue of empty voting through borrowing or lending shares 
by changing Article 25 WpHG. In the new Article 25.a WpHG that entered 
into force on 1 February 2012,95 disclosure duties are now extended to in-
clude ‘other instruments (“sonstige Instrumente”) which make it possible’ 
to acquire voting shares. Under the new rule, the existence of the right 
to demand the return of the lent / borrowed shares should be disclosed 
notwithstanding the lender’s eligibility to exercise his voting rights.96 Ac-
cording to the existing provisions, the obligation to notify is imposed both 
on the lender and the borrower. 
As for equity swaps, similar instruments that enable empty voting, 
the issue is also covered by the newly adopted Article 25.a WpHG (Mit-
teilungspflichten beim Halten von weiteren Finanzinstrumenten und son-
stigen Instrumenten) that entered into force on 1 February 2012.97 While 
Article 25.a WpHG significantly extends the notification obligations to all 
financial instruments and other instruments (‘sonstigen Instrumenten’) 
which (directly or indirectly) enable (ermöglichen) the holder or third par-
ties to acquire ordinary (voting) shares of the German issuers, equity 
swaps are also covered. It is irrelevant whether the equity swap is set-
tled in cash or in equity. Apart from (equity) swaps, Article 25.a WpHG 
covers in particular the financial contracts for difference, cash-settled 
call options, put options and other transactions that have the economic 
consequence of allowing for the acquisition of voting rights.98 In the view 
95 See the Act on Enhancement of Investor Protection and Improved Functioning of the 
Capital Market (Gesetz zur Stärkung des Anlegerschutzes und Verbesserung der Funk-
tionsfähigkeit des Kapitalmarkts (Anlegerschutz- und Funktionsverbesserungsgesetz (Ans-
FuG)), published on 5 April 2011, BGBl vol I, 538, which amended the Securities Trading 
Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG) in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung), published on 
9 September 1998, BGBl vol I, 2708, as last amended by Art 2 of the Law of 1 April 2015, 
BGBl vol I, 434.
96 A Merkner and M Sustmann, ‘Erste “Guidance” der BaFin zu den neuen Meldepflichten 
nach §§ 25, 25 a WpHG’ (2012) 7 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 244; Mittermeyer 
(n 24) 115.
97 See the Act on Enhancement of Investor Protection and Improved Functioning of the 
Capital Market (Gesetz zur Stärkung des Anlegerschutzes und Verbesserung der Funk-
tionsfähigkeit des Kapitalmarkts (Anlegerschutz- und Funktionsverbesserungsgesetz (Ans-
FuG)), published on 5 April 2011, BGBl vol I, 538, which amended the Securities Trading 
Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG) in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung), published on 
9 September 1998, BGBl vol I, 2708, as last amended by Art 2 of the law of 1 April 2015, 
BGBl vol I, 434.
98 Fleischer and Schmolke (n 10) 849; H Krause, ‘“Stakebuilding” im Kapitalmarkt-und 
Übernahmerecht’ in JA Kämmerer and R Veil, Übernahme- und Kapitalmarktrecht in der 
Reformdiskussion (Mohr Siebeck 2013) 169.
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of the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), there is 
high likelihood that Article 25.a WpHG will include shareholders’ agree-
ments containing the pre-emption clause (Vorkaufsrechte), as well as put 
options – the right to sell shares (Andienungsrechte). It should be noted 
that, according to German law, the notification threshold is set at 3% of 
the total voting rights. However, in the case that voting rights might be 
acquired by holding financial instruments, the threshold has been raised 
to 5%. 
In France the interpretation of the laws has led to the conclusion that 
lenders have the obligatory duty to notify. However, during the course of 
the implementation of the Transparency Directive different views pre-
vailed resulting in the adoption of the opposing view under which the 
borrower is obliged to notify.99 In order to combat excessive empty voting 
through borrowing shares, a new disclosure requirement has been intro-
duced in the revised Article L 225-126 of the French Commercial Code.100 
Accordingly, if a person holds by virtue of a temporary assignment or any 
transaction giving him/her the right or obligation to resell or return the 
respective shares to the assignor and those shares represent more than 
0.5% of the voting rights, a person is required to inform the company and 
the AMF of the total number of shares that he/she temporarily holds. 
The disclosure must be made no later than three business days prior 
to the general meeting, provided that the lending agreement is still in 
force on the day of the general meeting. Finally, the issuer has to publish 
the information. It has to be emphasised that the new regime provides 
drastic sanctions. If the borrower does not comply with the disclosure 
obligation, the shares will lose their voting entitlement at the general 
meeting. In addition, a court can separately prohibit the exercise of the 
voting right of a non-complying shareholder for up to five years. Finally, a 
shareholder resolution which involves a non-complying shareholder can 
be challenged in court and declared invalid.
As per equity swaps, new rules entered into force on 1 October 
2012.101 In calculating disclosure thresholds, all voting rights attached to 
the shares already issued are taken into account: CSDs granting to the 
reporting person an economic effect similar to that of owning the shares, 
99 Autorité des Merchés  Financiers (AMF) ‘Report of the working group chaired by Yves 
Mansion on securities lending before general meetings of shareholders’ (January 2008) 
<http://www.amf-france.org/en_US/Publications/Rapports-des-groupes-de-travail/Ar-
chives.html?docId=workspace%3A%2F%2FSpacesStore%2Fbc80320c-1a92-4041-b6d7-
07a5c95caa88> accessed 20 April 2015; Mazars (n 80) 124. See Arts L233-7 and L233-9 of 
the French Commercial Code and Arts 223-11 and 223-17 of the AMF General Regulations. 
100 Loi No 2010-1249 du 22 octobre 2010 de régulation bancaire et financière [2010] JORF 
18984.
101 Loi No 2012-387 du 22 mars 2012 relative à la simplification du droit et à l’allégement 
des démarches administratives [2012] JORF 5226.
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agreements or other financial instruments which have the same econom-
ic (financial) effect as holdings of shares, ie equity swaps, contract-for 
difference, cash-settled call options.102 
In the UK, Article 10 of the Transparency Directive was transposed 
through the Disclosure and Transparency Rules – Chapter 5 (DTR 5.2).103 
Accordingly, the duty to notify lies with the borrower. The adopted solu-
tion has its ratio in the fact that it is the lender who is the one who con-
trols the right to call back the shares. Although the shareholder alienates 
the shares, he/she simultaneously acquires the right to claim them back. 
Since the share would return on the lender’s initiative, the borrower may 
not freely dispose of them, which induces his/her obligation to notify 
about the lending transaction.104 The disclosure of derivatives in the UK 
is provided in Rules 8.3 and 9.1 of the Takeover Code and they are ap-
plied in the takeover procedure and in the provisions of Chapter 5 of the 
DTR. In 2005, the Takeover Panel amended the Takeover Code to require 
disclosure of cash-settled derivative (Contract for Difference, CfD) posi-
tions at 1% or more in both the target and the bidding company during 
the offer period. Disclosures of major shareholder notification under the 
FSA Handbook (DTR 5) were amended in 2009 in a way that this obli-
gation applies independently of whether these instruments are settled 
102 Before the amendments and modifications of the French Commercial Code that came 
into force on 1 October 2012, the issue of equity-settled derivatives and cash-settled de-
rivatives had been addressed in a different manner. For instance, shares or voting rights 
that may have been acquired by means of equity-settled derivatives were required to be 
taken into account when calculating the shareholders’ voting power under the condition the 
shares had already been issued and in the case that the holder of the financial instruments 
may acquire voting rights based on the holder’s own discretionary assessment in accord-
ance with the arrangement or financial instrument, at any time, irrespective of its matu-
rity (Art L 233-9(I)(4) of the French Commercial Code). In contrast, cash-settled financial 
instruments were not taken into account when calculating the shareholders voting power 
for the purpose of informing on changes in the percentage of voting rights. See Ordonnance 
No 2009-105 du 30 janvier 2009 relative aux rachats d’actions, aux déclarations de fran-
chissement de seuils et aux déclarations d’intentions [2009] JORF 26 sur 182. Sharehold-
ers required to disclose the holding of voting rights in a listed company were also required 
to disclose the number of shares which are the basis for issuing/concluding ‘an agreement 
or cash-settled financial instrument which ensures its holder the same financial interest 
as holding shares’, as well as the number of voting rights attached to the shares. However, 
the holding of voting rights which may be acquired through holding cash-settled financial 
instruments was not taken into account when calculating the shareholders’ voting power. 
See Art L 233-7 of the French Commercial Code. Nonetheless, French jurisprudence started 
seeing those derivatives as a part of disclosure duties. See the ruling in the case Wendel/
Saint Gobain as well as the ruling in Hermes/LVMH, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/
commission_2010-2014/piebalgs/multimedia/pdf/20111026_memo-11-734_en.pdf> ac-
cessed 15 April 2015. 
103 FSA Handbook, Disclosure and Transparency Rules – Chapter 5 (DTR 5). See more in A 
Hudson, Securities Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 405-406. 
104 Mazars, ‘Transparency Directive Assessment Report, Executive summary and possible 
improvements’ (2009) 13 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/trans-
parency/report-application_summary_en.pdf> accessed 20 November 2014.
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physically or in cash. The FSA opted for the general disclosure obligation 
triggered by CfD positions at or exceeding 3%.105 Vote holders must notify 
a listed company of the level of voting rights within two trading days of 
the date upon which they acquired or disposed of the CfD that triggered 
the notification obligation.106 If the FSA discovers that an issuer of se-
curities admitted to trading on a regulated market has failed to comply 
with the transparency rules, it may publicly censure the issuer and/or 
suspend or prohibit trading in the issuer’s securities.
In Italy, Resolution No 16850 of 1 April 2009 of the market regula-
tor, CONSOB, which entered into force on 24 April 2009, implemented 
the Transparency Directive.  Accordingly, disclosure duty lies with the 
lender.107 Article 118(2) of CONSOB Regulation No 11971 provides that, 
when the shares are subject to security lending or contango108 trans-
actions, the disclosure obligation is both the lender’s or the contango 
payer’s and the borrower’s or the contango broker’s. This obligation does 
not encumber the borrower or the contango broker in the case envisaged 
by Article 119bis(3.a), provided that the same does not exercise a voting 
right. As for equity swaps and other derivatives suitable for empty voting, 
on 9 September 2011 CONSOB approved new rules on the transparency 
of major holdings in listed issuers which came into force on 9 October 
2011.109 By modifying CONSOB Regulation No 11971 of 14 May 1999 
implementing Legislative Decree No 58 of 24 February 1998 Consolidated 
Law on Finance (‘Testo Unico’), the law extended the disclosure regime 
to equity swaps and other financial instruments and contracts grant-
ing a long position over the underlying shares. In order to streamline 
the reporting regime, the newly adopted rules increase the first relevant 
threshold for the disclosure of long potential holdings from the current 
2% to 5% of the relevant issuer’s voting capital.110 
105 M Kettunen and WG Ringe, ‘Disclosure Regulation of Cash-Settled Equity Derivatives: 
An Intentions-Based Approach’ (2011) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 36 <http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1844886> accessed 10 July 2014, highlight: ‘Instead of a general dis-
closure obligation, CfD disclosure should be narrowed to situations where these instru-
ments are to be used to obtain or increase control in the target company, either through a 
takeover or by otherwise influencing shareholder decision-making.’
106 The issuer must then make that information public as soon as possible. See more in 
M Blair, G Walker and S Willey (eds), Financial Markets and Exchanges Law (2nd edn, OUP 
2012) 200.
107 Mazars (n 104) 13. 
108 A situation where the futures price of a commodity is above the expected future spot 
price.
109 Resolution No 17919 of 9 September 2011, published in Official Gazette No 220 of 21 
September 2011 and in CONSOB fortnightly bulletin no 9.1, September 2011.
110 This increase is based on the cost benefit analysis carried out during the consultation 
process which indicated that the benefits in terms of market efficiency and transparency 
arising from the first disclosure threshold had proved to be rather marginal compared to the 
associated compliance costs.
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5 Facit
The best way to limit the negative effects of empty voting is trans-
parency and disclosure, the course taken by the EU legislator. The re-
vised Transparency Directive has enhanced the sanctioning powers of the 
competent authorities of the Member States, instructing them to publish 
sanctions, except in certain circumstances as defined in Article 28b of 
the Transparency Directive. Competent authorities of the Member States 
are authorised to suspend the exercise of voting rights of an issuer who 
breaches the notification rules on major holdings. In some countries a 
shareholder not complying with his/her disclosure duties is exposed to 
even more drastic sanctions such as the suspension of his/her voting 
rights (by a court decision) for up to several years.111 The introduction 
of the disclosure regime is accompanied by additional costs, especially if 
both parties to the transaction should disclose, if the disclosure is con-
tinuous, and if the threshold is set low. Although disclosing both short 
and long positions before the general meeting is certainly the most im-
portant momentum, because it enables other shareholders to render an 
informed decision, there are reasons which support a continuous disclo-
sure obligation over the entire business year.112 However, when prescrib-
ing disclosure duties, it is important to prevent information overload and 
to keep in mind that the mandatory disclosure of transactions leading 
to empty voting will not per se prevent its occurrence. In respect of the 
disclosure threshold, the current authors hold the view that the duty to 
disclose should be mandatory for existing shareholders who hold only a 
sizable long position, along with equally significant short positions. Only 
the magnitude of short positions (of otherwise long investors) shows a 
reduction/elimination of the investment risk that could be relevant to 
other shareholders. A separate disclosure of short and long positions is 
important, as is the disclosure of financial instruments which confer a 
right to a physical settlement distinct from those which confer the right 
to a cash settlement, as provided by the Transparency Directive. 
Some positive effects of empty voting should not be disregarded. 
When other shareholders are aware of the existence of empty voters, they 
can react by resorting to minority shareholders rights. Their ultimate 
measure is to sell their shares. Therefore, empty voting could strengthen 
shareholder activism and their active participation in the company deci-
sion-making process and, in turn, contribute to stronger control of the 
company management. This would motivate the rest of the investors to 
actively exercise their rights attached to the shares. It should be stressed 
that certain empty voting methods such as share lending have positive 
111 Ringe (n 4) 47.
112 Ringe (n 4) 53.
160 Edita Čulinović-Herc, Antonija Zubović: Tackling Empty Voting in the EU: The Shareholders...
effects and serve other functions in the capital market, especially the 
liquidity of shares.      
The authors are of the opinion that empty voting would generally be 
attractive as long as it can be done under the radar. If disclosed, it could 
result in institutional investors losing their reputation, so their financial 
ingenuity would invent new methods to reach the desired result. There-
fore, pure disclosure without ‘teeth’ is not enough, and it should be ac-
companied by powers of the competent body to sanction non-disclosure 
adequately. 
When the disputes come to the court, the outcome of the battle is 
uncertain. Both the Lindner and Telus cases show diverging views of the 
first-instance court and the Supreme Court. In the Telus case, two dif-
fering court decisions were even accompanied by two different pieces of 
expert advice provided by two professors who have written extensively on 
empty voting (Henry Hu and Bernard Black).  In such an unpredictable 
court environment where courts may resort to a formal or functional ap-
proach, the market regulator should be given the power to impose vot-
ing restrictions on particular shareholders. In this respect, the revised 
Transparency Directive seems to be on the right track, since it provides 
enforcement mechanisms for non-disclosure.
